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The aim of this study is to compare the results of successful mergers in terms of 
ranking performance of the so called ‘world-class’ universities in a European 
Union context, with a view to identifying the challenges these universities face in 
their post-merger situation and strategies. After a content analysis, four themes 
emerged: crucial factors at the pre-merger phase to ensure a successful merger, the 
best actions to be performed at the merger phase to ensure a successful merger, the 
main challenges faced at the post-merger phase, and post-merger strategies in the 
last phase. Then, we analysed the institutional post-merger strategies to find 
differences between different mergers. Our research shows that in all cases there 
is a mix of various local and national/international factors that need to be analysed 
in the post-merger phase before a merger can be deemed to be ‘successful’ overall, 
and before the various dimensions of the global impact of the merger can be 
assessed. 




Mergers in higher education have been studied from different points of view, but the post-
merger phase, also known as integration phase (Hall, Symes & Luescher, 2004), has been 
 
 
the least studied area in this process, with only a few examples analysed in depth, except 
for South Africa (Barnard & Van der Merwe, 2016). In Europe, the DEFINE project 
(Bennetot, Estermann & Mason, 2014) offered recommendations to universities facing 
mergers. 
The concept of institutional mergers in higher education is not a homogenous one. 
With a merger, two or more separate organisations form a unitary structure and overall 
management control comes under a single governing body and single chief executive 
(Harman & Harman, 2008). 
Higher education mergers have been used, among other reasons, as a means to 
improve international position and as a way to enter the group of the so-called ‘world-
class universities’ to gain more world visibility (Hazelkorn, 2007). Moreover, ‘excellence 
in research underpins the idea of world-class research that is recognised by peers’ 
(Altbach, 2015, p. 6). We can assume that cross-national competition is behind the desire 
to claim the status of a world-class university, sometimes without there really being any 
solid evidence to back up this claim (Wangenge-Ouma, 2010). Although 
internationalisation is difficult to define and criticism of international rankings has been 
widespread (Hazelkorn, Loukkola & Zhang, 2014), internationalisation (Deschamps & 
Lee, 2015) and world visibility (Docampo, Egret & Cram, 2015), underlie the concept of 
world-class universities. There is a positive co-relation between world visibility and 
university rankings (Lee & Park, 2012), like the Academic Ranking of World Universities 
(ARWU 2005-2015, University of Shanghai) or the QS University Ranking (QS 
company).  
Despite the autonomy universities are supposed to have, governments set the 
guidelines by which institutions in their countries have to abide, so both government and 
universities play a role in mergers and have used mergers for different purposes. The first, 
 
 
especially in Europe, attempt (Walsh, 2014) to include their universities in the 
international top-100 league while increasing and improving academic productivity 
(Huisman, 2008; Slade, Ribando & Fortner, 2016). The latter also promote mergers as a 
way to combat financial cuts by increasing efficiency, though some authors claim that 
efficiency gains ‘may be a consequence of something other than the merger’ (Johnes, 
2014, p.485) and that ‘ the issues surrounding economies of scale in higher education are 
complex, and should not be considered from a single level perspective, or a single likely 
effect’ (Patterson, 2000, p.268) 
In this study, we compare the results of successful mergers involving world-class 
universities in the European Union that have subsequently led to an improvement in their 
position in higher education rankings (ARWU or QS), with a view to identifying the 
challenges these universities face in their post-merger situation. Therefore, we defined 
four research questions to analyse the post-merger situation in terms of enablers and 
results: RQ1 Why were these mergers successful?, RQ2 Were there any differences 
depending on their international position?, RQ3 How are they facing the post-merger 
phase?, and RQ4 Can we identify any differences in post-merger strategies in terms of 
their institutional model? Our conceptual world view was twofold, based on pragmatism, 
using mixed methods to study and compare different cases, and constructivism, exploring 
post-merger models. 
Literature review 
We used the Scopus database with Web of Science and Google Scholar. In an initial 
search, we obtained 1,394 results in Scopus using the keywords (merger AND higher 
education) OR (merger AND university) in the fields of social sciences. Then, we refined 
the search, focusing it on papers only related to higher education, and excluding journals 
which had no related scope. In this second search, we found also false negatives, thus 
 
 
bringing our final total to 81 papers. 
As Figure 1 shows, the papers found in Scopus formed three groups from keyword 
co-occurrences. We used VOSviewer software to display this information with different 
figures: ‘The colour of an item is determined by the cluster to which the item belongs’ 
(Van Eck & Waltman 2016, p. 4). A first group (A) focused on the impact and change 
that the merger represents (this could be the pre-merger phase); a second group (B) 
focused on the process of ‘building’ a new university and the role of the different 
institutions (merger phase); and a third group (C) focused on the results of the merger in 
terms of performance and research (post-merger phase). 
 
Figure 1. Paper network using Scopus Database and VOSviewer (Van Eck & Waltman 
2016). 
 
The post-merger phase is a phase of evaluation, where the results can only be 
assessed after some years. According to the literature, mergers are complex processes that 
would need up to 10 years to achieve their full potential (Harman & Harman, 2003). The 
 
 
pre-merger stage is especially stressful, due to the uncertainty it generates among 
employees if an active communication plan is not designed (Govender & Rampersad, 
2016). 
The integration process requires the implementation of a new mission, vision, 
culture, identity (Puusa & Kekäle, 2015), processes and procedures, and serious efforts 
to reduce bureaucracy as much as possible (Mael, 2014). In this phase, strong leadership 
is crucial to bring together all the previous cultures (Puusa & Kekäle, 2013).  
According to the literature, higher education mergers face critical cultural factors 
(Ripoll-Soler & de-Miguel-Molina, 2013). These are related to attitudes of resistance 
(Aspara, Aula, Tienari & Tikkanen, 2014), the perceived benefits for each party (Gleibs, 
Täuber, Viki & Giessner, 2013), organisational change and destabilisation (Lawlor, 
2013), future challenges (Mael, E. 2014), an increase in stress (Evans, 2015), redefining 
the academic profile (Ylijoki, 2014), and culture confrontations between the different 
parties (Aspara et al., 2014). In general, employees have positive and negative perceptions 
(soft factors) that have received less attention in literature (Lawlor, 2013). 
One of the major challenges in the post-merger phase is to create a common 
academic culture. Case studies have shown that the crucial factors to generate this new 
culture in the merged institution involve a voluntary process of merging horizontal and 
complementary institutions, bilateral partnerships and a favourable context (Ripoll-Soler 
& de-Miguel-Molina, 2013; 2014). Therefore, our first research question ‘RQ1 Why were 
these mergers successful?’, should be related to this question: Can the case studies 
explored be related to ‘crucial factors’ to create a common vision? 
The DEFINE project (Beentot et al., 2014) presented some recommendations on 
how to obtain successful results, such as synergies with public authorities, giving 
precedence to the academic mission, exploring other alternatives, using change 
 
 
management methodologies, and internal and external communication. A comparison of 
these ‘best actions’ in the mergers under study can help us to respond to ‘RQ2 Were there 
differences depending on their international position?’. 
In short, according to the literature review, the ‘main challenges’ of a post-merger 
phase are to achieve a common culture, to tackle bureaucracy (Ripoll-Soler & de-Miguel-
Molina, 2013), to adjust existing resources (Hidalgo-Hidalgo & Valera, 2016), and to 
improve the range of academic courses on offer (Ylijoki, 2014) as well as the international 
research position. Moreover, physical location can also be a key factor (Lawlor, 2013) 
during pre-merger strategic deliberations, and one of the main reasons why ‘in most cases 
mergers are with regional partners’ (Frølich, Trondal, Caspersen & Reymert, 2016, p. 
12). These are the challenges that we must tackle with our third research question: ‘RQ3 
How are they facing the post-merger phase?’ 
Method 
We followed a descriptive and deductive method, based on the results of the literature 
review, in order to compare cross-case studies of mergers in Europe. Our research design, 
based on the theoretical framework, took ‘successful higher education mergers in Europe’ 
as its unit of analysis, involving universities, and studying why they succeed and how 
they face future challenges (RQ4). We used an inductive approach to determine three 
institutional models according to the type of merging institutions (t1: 
university+university; t2: specialised institution+specialised institution and t3: 
university+specialised institution). 
To gather the necessary data, we applied a triangulation model, using multiple 
data sources like strategic plans from each institution, university rankings, a literature 
review of the specific cases and in-depth interviews (n=7) with managers involved in the 
new university model. We chose cross-case studies to compare some mergers, following 
 
 
Berg and Lune (2012), because it ‘can reveal both the shared and the unique sense-making 
decisions’ (p. 328). 
Our population consisted of European Union universities where rankings were 
part of their strategic decisions. Our sample of institutions was composed of five 
universities, four of them were from ARWU: two universities (Strasbourg and 
Manchester) from ARWU 2015’s Top 100 (from five ‘hard’ mergers whose ranking 
improved) plus two universities (Lisbon and Aalto) which ranked lower in ARWU 2015 
but whose results improved (around 15). From the ARWU 2015 Top 100, we excluded 
the cases of two universities whose results remained the same or got worse: Edinburgh 
has ranked 47th since 2005 and Uppsala fell slightly to 61st. Therefore, we can observe 
that out of 22 European mergers (ARWU), only 7 appear in the ARWU Top 100: 
Strasbourg, Manchester, University College London, Copenhagen, Paris Sud XI, 
Edinburgh and Uppsala. As a control, we compared these universities with a case in which 
two specialised institutions (Centrale-Supélec) merged. This case did not appear in 
ARWU but improved its ranking slightly, entering the QS ranking in 2015 at 156. The 
merged institution also participated in another federation Project called Paris Saclay.  
Additionally, we gathered public information from the EU-backed DEFINE 
(Bennetot et al., 2014) project (although its results include other kinds of collaborations 
based on the CAM concept – collaborations, amalgamations and mergers), to check 
whether our cases followed the DEFINE recommendations. According to the DEFINE 
online tool, there were around 32 European mergers outside ARWU. Once again, we can 
see that out of a total of 54 mergers in Europe, only 22 of the merged universities appear 
in ARWU. 
We identified seven key informants from the sample of institutions and performed 
seven semi-structured in-depth interviews (17 hours of interview time recorded and 
 
 
82,246 words transcribed) as part of the data triangulation. The interviews took place 
between October 2014 and May 2016. We can also say that the group of informants was 
homogenous (university managers) (Bonde, 2013). The sample was purposeful and had 
sufficient data saturation (Guetterman, 2016). Aalto University was the first case 
analysed, so we held two interviews in order to validate the semi-structured questionnaire. 
In the case of University of Strasbourg, we also did two interviews as the first interview 
was not long enough. Five of the participants were male and two were female. 
To analyse the different documents and audios, we used content analysis. Berg 
and Lune (2012) defined this method as: ‘The analysis is designed to “code” the content 
as data in a form that can be used to address research questions’ (pp. 349-350). 
Four themes emerged: crucial factors (C1) at the pre-merger phase to ensure a 
successful merger (RQ1), the best actions (C2) to be performed at the merger phase to 
ensure a successful merger (RQ2), the main challenges (C3) faced at the post-merger 
phase (RQ3), and post-merger strategies (C4) in the last phase. We grouped and coded 
the information as follows: 
• C1-RQ1 Crucial factors: voluntary (1.1), horizontal and complementary (1.2), 
small number (1.3) and favourable context (1.4). 
• C2-RQ2 Best actions: synergies with public authorities (2.1), precedence of 
academic mission (2.2), other alternatives explored (2.3), change management 
methodologies (2.4), internal communication (2.5) and external communication 
(2.6). 
• C3-RQ3 Challenges: to achieve a common culture (3.1), to tackle bureaucracy 
(3.2), to adjust existing resources (3.3), to improve the range of academic courses 
on offer (3.4) and the university’s international research position (3.5), and 
physical location (3.6). 
 
 
• C4-RQ4 Post-merger strategies related to the type of merger: strategies were 
defined following an inductive analysis of the interviews. 
These categories were summarised in a first model (Table 1) which presents a 
typology of descriptors to compare three types of higher education mergers and the 
institutional model that emerges: university+university (t1), specialised 
institution+specialised institution (t2), and university+specialised institution (t3). 
Table 1. Model to compare different types of university mergers 
 
The model was used to prepare the interview protocol and carry out a content 
analysis of the interviews and the rest of documents. The interviews were structured 
around the following sections: 
a) General overview of the merger process and its context. 
b) University merger models. 
c) Government influence. 
d) Partners involved in the merger. 
e) Creating the new culture. 
f) Results of the merger. 
 
Results of the comparative analysis 
Aalto University (Finland) 
Aalto University (AU) started to operate in 2010 (Aalto University, 2011). It was a t3 
type merger, the result of a merger between one large university (Helsinki University of 
Technology), and two smaller ones (Helsinki School of Economics and the University of 
 
 
Arts and Design Helsinki). It was horizontal and complementary in terms of their different 
academic profiles with few overlaps. 
The merger of Aalto was not voluntary. Instead, it was forced by a shift of 
paradigm. It was the answer to a new context where complexity was dominant and the 
competition for talent became international. 
It is fundamental to first look at universities on a global scale, where there is 
increasing competition between universities all around the world. It is not so much 
about money, but rather about talent. (Informant 2) 
Meanwhile universities were seen as ‘being not good enough’ (Informant 2) by 
government and industry, which were asking for a radical change to tackle key issues in 
the Finnish higher education system. Companies were also looking for better access to 
human capital. Though government and industry were not asking for a merger, they 
created the opportunity window for it to take place. Aalto’s partners saw the opportunity 
and proposed a merger project based on a strong, multidisciplinary academic identity, 
financial and administrative freedom and separation from the state. 
Many European universities have seen the case of Aalto as being an example of a 
successful merger, not because it moved into the top 100, but because it fulfilled most of 
the crucial factors for a merger. However, we found that the former universities faced 
drawbacks as a result of the merger, such as difficulties to agree upon common increased 
bureaucracy, as Mael (2014) also stated. 
Though they were in ARWU and had had the same ranking (401-500) more or 
less from 2005-2015, there was a negative initial effect on their international research 
position, according to ARWU.  
 
 
Helsinki University of Technology was more research and publishing oriented than 
the two others... if you go for the general ranking the numbers will go down. 
(Informant 1) 
Therefore, the new academic model was firstly based on attracting the best 
students and secondly on incorporating the best academics from all over the world with 
a tenure track system. This change is underway but will need at least 10 years before it is 
finished, which is in line with Harman & Harman (2003): 
After 10 years, you can roughly say that all the students that have come to Aalto 
don’t know the former universities as such. (Informant 1) 
Centrale-Supélec (France) 
Centrale-Supélec (CS) is a t2 type merger, which happened in 2015 (CentraleSupélec, 
2017) and is the result of merging two specialised institutions in France called ‘Grandes 
Écoles’: École Centrale and Supélec. They both had a very high educational profile but 
were looking to promote their research activities. A preliminary analysis conducted by 
École Centrale concluded that they needed a critical mass in order to have quality research 
and that research would be the best way to achieve international relevance and a means 
to attract more funds and to be present in rankings. Their result is quite satisfactory, and 
the merged institution ranks 140th in QS 2019, though has a better standing in engineering 
(51-100). 
The merger between Centrale and Supélec was voluntary. Government approved 
the merger although it did not provide many economic incentives. It was horizontal and 
complementary with teaching profiles that did not overlap as there were only two 
institutions and both had very good connections with industry. They complied with 
almost all of the ‘crucial factors’, though the context, which was not necessarily 
 
 
‘unfavourable’, lacked the necessary pressure and economic incentives to move things 
along faster: 
The directors from both Centrale and Supélec appointed an independent project 
leader to make them agree on the project… the pre-merger phase… lasted more than 
4 years. This is definitely too long. (Informant 3) 
As Aspara (2014) remarks, generating a common culture is very difficult, at least 
in the initial years of merger implementation: 
You need to make big efforts to get people to work together, get to know each other, 
share spaces, build a new culture… Now we are merging the core activities: teaching 
and research. (Informant 3) 
At the moment, apart from building a common culture, Centrale-Supélec faces 
two main challenges: their location and their participation in ‘Paris Saclay’ (French 
Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research, 2014), where we 
detected an scenario almost the opposite to that of Centrale-Supélec, lacking most of the 
crucial factors, except for the government pushing integration by injecting additional 
resources into the project. 
The University of Lisbon (Portugal) 
In order to increase their international profile, develop their academic profile and achieve 
higher positions in rankings, the University of Lisbon and the Technical University of 
Lisbon, two universities each with about 25,000 students with complementary profiles, 
merged to create the University of Lisbon (UL), a t1 type merger, in 2013 (Portuguese 
Ministry of Science and Education, 2013; Universidade de Lisboa, 2014). They merged 
voluntarily, with few overlaps, as a reaction to the economic crisis in Portugal, that had 
‘a significant impact on the resources available for education, making that the HEI 
 
 
restructures its organization in consequence of the austerity measures’ (David, Abreu, 
Segura, Formigoni & Mantovani, 2015, p. 6061). There were historical reasons involved 
in the operation. 
The main characteristic of this merger was the autonomy of the different schools, 
making the merger process easier because no restructuring of schools was required thus 
leaving power relations mainly as they had been: 
One of the things discussed during the merger process was that there should be a big 
autonomy within the hands of the Schools. (Informant 4) 
The main aim of the merger process was to reduce the size of the rectorate and 
central services and to channel human resources to the schools, building a new central 
structure and regulations: 
A huge part of my work during the first two years has been mainly bureaucratic, to 
make regulations for everything. (Informant 4) 
This is in line with Mael (2014), who discussed tackling bureaucracy, and 
Hidalgo-Hidalgo and Valera (2016), who stated the need for adjusting existing resources 
as a consequence of a merger process. 
The merger centred on improving its research position by being a larger 
institution, and increasing the number of new multidisciplinary approaches by having 
more disciplines in the same institution. There was almost no mention of any teaching 
restructuring beyond some changes in doctoral training. Their strongest action before and 
during the merger was internal communication, a topic also discussed by Bennetot et al. 
(2014), carrying out negotiations with all the personnel. 
You can’t take organisational decisions. They have to be postponed to the post-
merger. (Informant 4) 
 
 
In terms of rankings, they focused on improving their ARWU position, which 
seems to have been achieved. In 2018, it ranked in the 151-200 bracket (ARWU 2018). 
The role of other stakeholders in this process was very low key. Companies had no role 
in the process and the government did not provide any economic incentives. 
The University of Manchester (United Kingdom) 
The University of Manchester (UM), a t3 type merger, is the result of merging a small, 
highly specialised university, the University of Manchester Institute of Science and 
Technology (UMIST) and the Victoria University of Manchester (VUM), a large 
generalist university. Historically, both institutions had strong links until 1994 when 
UMIST obtained its own award degree powers. The new university started to operate as 
such in 2004 (Abendstern, 2007). A joint working group, made up of four members from 
each institution, was set up by the heads of the two universities and was independently 
chaired by a former executive and government adviser. They analysed the different types 
of partnerships available and ended up opting for the dissolution of the two existing 
universities and the creation of a single new one. This is in line with the recommendations 
made by Bennetot et al. (2014). 
This merger was the reaction to achieve world-class status to compete with the 
very best universities (Georghiou, 2015) by means of rankings, fund raising and 
internationalisation. In the case of UMIST, it was also a survival strategy. The influence 
of industry in the city is almost inexistent nowadays. Regional government reacted by 
providing additional funding for the new institution but did not promote any other 
changes to support the merger. 
Strong leadership, cooperation and the precedence of an academic mission was 
fundamental for the success of this merger. Though they first focused on the academic 
 
 
part, they also followed a structural approach to diminish administrative redundancies 
two years after the merger. Cultural shocks were quite relevant in this case: 
There were probably three cultures… there were the people on either side that were 
not really very sure or not really very happy. Then there were those who were saying 
"well this is a new opportunity, let’s go for it". And those against it, trying to 
understand something new by oversimplifying. (Informant 5) 
It was very clear that for these two universities the main objective was to be in the 
top 100. In this sense, they are the best example of success as in 2018 they ranked 34th 
on ARWU 2018: 
The Shanghai Jiao Tong index doesn't change the weightings so rapidly from year 
to year as the others, so it is a more consistent indicator. (Informant 5) 
In 2015, the University of Manchester had around 35,800 students (ARWU 2015). 
Therefore, it is still within the limit of what we found to be the optimal size of around 
30,000 (Ripoll-Soler & de-Miguel-Molina, 2014). 
The University of Strasbourg (France) 
Three universities merged in 2009 on a t1 type merger: University Louis Pasteur, 
University Robert Schuman and University Marc Bloch, producing the ‘Renaissance’ of 
the former University of Strasbourg (US) (Musselin & Dif-Pradalier, 2014) that had been 
split into three different universities after the 1968 student protests in France. It was a 
long process as different cultures were involved: 
We needed five years until the impact of the merger could be considered a success. 
(Informant 6) 
Though informant 6 says ‘it was voluntary’, the Government played an important 
role in pushing some initiatives to improve the performance of French universities in 
 
 
ARWU (Docampo, Egret & Cram, 2014). The vision of the new university itself was not 
so clear. There was a lack of internal communication with the academics and 
administrative personnel during the merger. 
In 2015, the new university had around 42,000 students (ARWU 2015). That is, 
it is a large university, compared to those in the top 100. After six years, some objectives 
have been reached but no new organisational structure has emerged for the university. 
There were clear overlaps between the three former universities and no new academic 
profile has been defined, as discussed by Ylijoki (2014). Cultural roots are still difficult 
to handle and, in line with Lawlor (2013), people still feel quite upset about the merger: 
Researchers do work with other institutions and when they have results they mention 
their research centre but they do not mention they are part of the University of 
Strasbourg. (Informant 6) 
From 2005-2015, the University’s ARWU position improved and it moved into 
the top 100, but since 2016 its position decreased on the ranking to the 101-150 bracket 
(ARWU 2018). Moreover, cultural resistance and the lack of strong leadership are not 
helping to give the university the necessary power to move forward: 
It needs a core team of people who are going stick together whatever. (Informant 7) 
Revision 
 
After an inductive content analysis of all the materials, we found a new crucial 
factor for RQ1 related to decentralisation (1.5), another best action for RQ2 about 
connections with industry (2.7) and six potential merger strategies related to size (4.1), 
rankings (4.2), support (4.3), funding (4.4), orientation (4.5) and new business model 
(4.6). An updated version of the first model is shown in Table 2 including the new 
insights. We found the comparative results shown in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 2. Model to compare different types of university mergers (revised). 
Table 3. Comparative analysis of the results. 
 
The co-occurrences in the content analysis of the interviews (Figure 2) enabled us 
to confirm some of the categories in our model: 
• The importance of internal communication (Bennetot et al., 2014; Evans, 2015; 
Lawlor, 2013) to discuss the merger, with strong leadership and a robust team 
being crucial (cluster 1). 
• Conversely, external communication mainly involves government and ministries 
(Bennetot et al., 2014), but also industry (cluster 2). In this case, students are 
normally seen as stakeholders rather than participants (with few exceptions). 
• Finally, the post-merger models face a major challenge: people and culture 
(Lawlor, 2013) (cluster 3). However, this is also influenced by the type of merger, 
with a special focus on mergers between two different institutions (university and 
specialised institution) or when one of them wants to maintain its status 




Figure 1. Interview network using VOSviewer (Van Eck & Waltman 2016). 
Concluding discussion 
We first detected that only Aalto University admitted that the merger could be a reaction 
to external pressure. The rest claim that the mergers were totally voluntary given that 
nobody can force them to do so, according to the law and principle of autonomy. 
Governments in Europe cannot force universities to merge, but they can create a 
favourable context providing incentives (Goedegebuure, 2012; Harman & Meek, 2002; 
Hazelkorn, 2007; Ripoll-Soler & de-Miguel-Molina, 2013; 2014). The pressure to merge 
is even greater if industry also cooperates, or even the press (Salmi & Saroyan, 2007). 
Nonetheless, as Frølich, et al. (2016) say, ‘most of the merger processes are done in the 
sequence of voluntary mergers before enforced mergers are imposed’ (p. 5).  
 
 
We found that, if the university is strongly decentralised, as is the case of Lisbon, 
the process itself becomes very smooth and all the efforts concentrate on merging central 
services and channelling excess capacity to the schools. The challenges are considerably 
reduced, with no need to achieve a common culture because the predominant cultures are 
the ones that prevail in the schools. These cultures are linked with academic autonomy, a 
value that remains strong even in a stratified higher education system (Henkel, 2005). 
According to Informant 2, ‘If you develop an administrative culture that is dominated by 
one of the previous cultures it has negative effects’. We consider it should be necessary 
to assess to what extent this finding would be useful to institutional decision-making. 
In terms of leadership we found that, while mergers require strong leadership 
(Chipunza & Gwarinda, 2010), not all merged universities provide this: 
We go in and we try to be as open as possible because we want to do this together… 
and it needs a huge dose of humility and generosity. (Informant 6) 
Though some authors like Kyvik (1995) or Mao, Du & Lia (2009) argue that there 
is no direct relationship between the size of an institution and its scientific productivity, 
the case of Lisbon is closely connected with the size effect of merging two institutions. 
Nonetheless, its performance in publications and impact on the ranking is very low when 
compared to Manchester which, with almost the same number of publications in 2005, 
had moved up the ranking much further than Lisbon in 2015. To be identified with the 
main city they are in also seems to be very important for the majority of universities, but 
not for the specialised ones. 
Only Aalto excluded rankings as part of the main rationale for the merger but, as 
shown on ARWU 2018, they are improving their position year after year. This finding 
supports the idea of comprehensive reorganisation of the university to build a truly new 
 
 
institution by putting almost all of the potential best actions into practice and giving 
precedence to the academic mission (Bennetot et al., 2014): 
That means that you are among the best universities but not in terms of specific 
numbers. World-class is a statement of excellence in all aspects. (Informant 2) 
The only case that underperforms in rankings is the University of Strasbourg, 
which has the least crucial factors (only voluntary and complementary) presented in this 
study, some of which is backed up by other authors like Bennetot et al. (2014). Though it 
has been positively assessed over the last ten-year period, it underperformed considerably 
at the time of the merger and in the 2018 results. 
According to our comparative analysis, the merger that has performed best in 
ARWU is the University of Manchester and the merger that has performed worst is the 
University of Strasbourg. This is in accordance with the most recent ARWU 2018, in 
which Manchester’s ranking improved while Strasbourg lost ground. As Table 4 shows, 
only the University of Strasbourg has not improved its ranking since the merger. 
Table 4. Comparative performance in the international ranking 2005-2015-2018. 
Source: Own source. WoS: Web of Science publications. 
 
We consider that working on best actions helps to reduce uncertainty in the 
environment, implying the institution has to face fewer challenges. Hence, institutions 
implementing the largest number of best actions had less challenges to face than their 
counterparts. A wider quantitative analysis would be a solid base to confirm these 
insights. 
Like mergers that take place in other types of entities, institutional mergers in 
higher education are always special cases that bear the footprint of those who initiate and 
implement them, as well as the distinctive features of their location, the starting position 
 
 
of the entities involved and the ambitions that guide them. The key factor determining 
relative success or failure is human attitudes and behaviour, in particular in terms of the 
ability of individuals and groups to anticipate, accept and shape the necessary cultural 
change required by mergers. 
While all these aspects need to be dealt with in the pre-merger and implementation 
phase, they are of particular relevance in the post-merger period, given the patterns that 
change over time after the formal merger date so ‘a long-term perspective is needed to 
ensure an understanding of institutional trajectories’ (Fumasoli, Pinheiro & Stensaker, 
2015, p. 23).  
This paper provides a structured method for analysing merger processes in their 
different phases. We provide a selection of crucial factors, best actions and main 
challenges based on the literature review and on inductive content analysis. Our main 
contribution is a set of post-merger strategies, that we consider will help in overcoming 
the absence of practical approaches on how to develop the institution once the merger is 
done (Frølich et al., 2016). We believe that our observations can be of great help for 
decision makers in universities and all those in national or regional government 
considering mergers. 
Our research has shown that in all cases there is a mix of various local and 
national/international factors that need to be analysed in the post-merger phase before a 
merger can be deemed to be an overall success, and the various dimensions of the overall 
impact of the merger can be assessed. We are also fully aware that as time goes by after 
a merger the balance of benefits and problems may shift in one direction or another – 
since the post-merger phase has a starting point but no end, and corrective measures may 
or may not be taken in order to address ongoing or new difficulties faced by the merged 
 
 
institution. From this perspective, it would be highly interesting to re-evaluate the cases 
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Table 1. Model to compare different types of university mergers 





Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
1.2: Horizontal and 
complementary 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
1.3: Small number 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
Gleibs, et al., 2013 
1.4: Favourable context 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 




2.1: Synergies with 
public authorities 
Hazelkorn, 2007 
Bennetot et al, 2014 
Walsh, 2014 
2.2: Precedence of 
academic mission 
Slade et al., 2016 
Huisman, 2008 
Ylijoki, 2014 
Bennetot et al, 2014 
2.3: Other alternatives 
explored 












Bennetot et al, 2014 
2.6: External 
communication 




3.1: Achieve a common 
culture 
Puusa & Kekäle, 2015 
Aspara et al., 2014 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
3.2: Tackle bureaucracy 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
Mael, E. 2014 





3.4: To improve the 
range of academic 
courses on offer 
Hidalgo-Hidalgo & 
Valera, 2016 





Deschamps & Lee, 2014 
Docampo et al., 2015 
Lee & Park, 2012 
3.6: Physical location 
Lawlor, 2013 






Table 2. Model to compare different types of university mergers (revised) 





Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
1.2: Horizontal and 
complementary 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
1.3: Small number 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
Gleibs, et al., 2013 
1.4: Favourable context 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
Harman & Harman, 2003 




2.1: Synergies with 
public authorities 
Hazelkorn, 2007 
Bennetot et al, 2014 
Walsh, 2014 
2.2: Precedence of 
academic mission 
Slade et al., 2016 
Huisman, 2008 
Ylijoki, 2014 
Bennetot et al, 2014 
2.3: Other alternatives 
explored 












Bennetot et al, 2014 
2.6: External 
communication 
Bennetot et al, 2014 







3.1: Achieve a common 
culture 
Puusa & Kekäle, 2015 
Aspara et al., 2014 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
3.2: Tackle bureaucracy 
Ripoll & De Miguel, 
2013; 2014 
Mael, E. 2014 





3.4: To improve the 
range of academic 
courses on offer 
Hidalgo-Hidalgo & 
Valera, 2016 





Deschamps & Lee, 2014 
Docampo et al., 2015 
Lee & Park, 2012 
 
 
3.6: Physical location 
Lawlor, 2013 





4.1.a Size: big 
4.1.b Size: small 
Own sources 
4.2 rankings 
4.3.a support: public 
4.3.b support: private 
4.4.a funding: research 
4.4.b funding: fund 
raising 
4.4.c funding: real state 
4.5.a orientation: city 
4.5.b orientation:  
business 








Table 3. Comparative analysis of the results 
   AU CS UL UM US 




1.1 0 1 1 1 1 
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 
1.3 1 1 1 1 0 
1.4 1 0 0 1 0 
1.5 0 0 1 0 0 




2.1 1 1 1 1 1 
2.2 1 0 0 0 1 
2.3 1 1 0 1 0 
2.4 1 1 0 0 0 
2.5 1 1 1 1 0 
2.6 1 0 1 1 1 
2.7 1 0 0 0 0 




3.1 0 1 0 1 1 
3.2 0 1 1 1 0 
3.3 1 1 1 1 1 
3.4 1 1 0 1 1 
3.5 1 1 0 1 1 
3.6 1 1 0 0 0 
  Total: 4 6 2 5 4 





4.1.b 1 1 0 0 0 
4.2 0 1 1 1 1 
4.3.a 1 1 0 0 1 
4.3.b 1 0 0 0 0 
4.4.a 0 0 0 0 0 
4.4.b 0 0 0 1 0 
4.4.c 0 0 1 0 0 
4.5.a 0 0 1 1 1 
4.5.b 0 0 0 0 0 
4.6 1 1 0 0 0 







Table 4. Comparative performance in the international ranking 2005-2015-2018 
  AU CS UL UM US 
 Merger year 2010 2015 2013 2004 2009 
ARWU 
Merger year 401-500 - 301-400 78 101-151 
2005 401-500 - 401-500 53 92 
2015 401-500 - 201-300 41 87 
2018 301-400 - 151-200 34 101-150 
Result P - P P N 
QS 
Merger year 250 - - 43 246 
2005 - - - 35 131 
2015 187 156 501-550 30 226 
2019 140 137 355 34 303 
Result P P P P N 
WoS 
2005 1,134 431 2,224 5,065 1,527 
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Figure 1. Paper network using Scopus Database and VOSviewer (Van Eck & Waltman 
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Figure 2. Interview network using VOSviewer (Van Eck and Waltman 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
